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Risk, Capital and Financial Crisis:  
 Evidence for Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) Banks1  
 
1. Introduction  
The relationship between bank capital and risk-taking is one of the key issues in the  
banking literature. The minimum capital standards advocated by the Basel Committee which are  
sought to be implemented are premised on the rationale that increased capital enhances bank  
safety. However, this premise might often turn out to be less than relevant. By way of example,  
increased capital might induce a bank to assume greater risks. If this effect outweighs the buffer  
effect of capital, highly capitalized bank might experience a higher probability of failure. Such risk- 
taking behavior explains why otherwise well-capitalised banks often experience significant declines  
in their capital position.  
The aim of this paper is to push forward the empirical literature by examining the 
relation between capital and risk for GCC banks. Our study seeks to shed light on the association 
between these two variables and how it was affected during the financial crisis.  
The GCC banking system provides a reasonable laboratory to examine this issue in a 
holistic  fashion.  These  countries  share  similar  economic  and  social  characteristics  and  are 
essentially dependent on a single primary commodity for exports.. Following the oil boom, real GDP 
growth in these countries averaged over 6.5% during 2003-08 as compared to less than 4% during 
the preceding five year period. The economic crisis and its after-effects, including the headwinds of the 
Arab Spring slowed down these economies considerably, with real GDP growth dwindling to 0.3% in 
2009, although growth has since turned a corner (IMF, 2013). The fiscal and external positions also 
witnessed an upturn, providing headroom to the authorities for greater economic diversification, while 
allowing the surpluses to be invested for productive purposes.  
We contribute to the literature in a few important ways. First, to the best of our  
knowledge, this is one of the early studies for GCC countries to examine the interlinkage between  
capital and risk. Second, our paper extends the literature on ownership and bank risk by focusing on  
the response of Islamic and commercial banks for an extended period. Several studies (Hasan and  
Dridi, 2010; Abedifar et al., 2013) suggest that there are no significant differences in the stability of  
Islamic and conventional banks. The paper also contributes to the literature that examines the  
relevance of funding structure for bank risk. The pre-crisis literature opined in favour of market  
funding, arguing that the ‘market discipline’ embedded in such funding coupled with its relatively low  
cost could enable banks to fund their asset expansion in a swift and cost-effective manner (Calomiris  
and Kahn, 1991). The recent financial crisis has however exposed the weaknesses of this argument.  
Huang and Ratnovski (2008) for example, show that banks that relied less on wholesale funding  
were able to better withstand the impact of the crisis.  
 
1 The views expressed and the approach pursued are entirely personal.  
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The rest of the analysis continues as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the 
relevant literature. This is followed by the database and variables employed in the study, followed by the 
empirical strategy (Section 4), results (Section 5) and concluding remarks (Section 6).  
 
II. Relevant literature  
The literature on the relationship between bank capital and risk can be classified into 
theoretical and empirical components. As regards the former, Kim and Santomero (1988) have 
observed that less risk-averse banks will prefer low levels of capital.  
The other line of thinking that contends a positive association between bank capital and  
risk has emphasized the unintended effects of implementing minimum regulatory capital standards.  
Koehn and Santomero (1980) and Kim and Santomero (1988) observe that constraints on a bank’s  
leverage due to minimum regulatory standards may cause banks to view leverage and risk as  
substitutes. As a result, in response to regulatory requirements, a bank that is forced to lower its  
leverage might end up raising its risk level. As a result, we will observe a positive relationship  
between bank capital and risk for those banks that have levels of capital near the minimum  
regulatory requirements.  
Another line of argument derives from the fact that higher capital requirements lower the 
charter value of banks, in turn, compelling them to assume higher risks (Besanko and Kantas, 1996; 
Hellmann et al., 2000). An additional reason for the positive capital-risk relationship follows from the 
bankruptcy cost avoidance hypothesis of Orgler and Taggart (1983). According to the authors, banks 
operating with high levels of portfolio risk tend to hold higher capital levels due to the fact that their 
probability of bankruptcy is higher.  
Several empirical studies have tested the above hypotheses on the relationship between  
changes in bank capital and changes in risk. Most of those studies have employed data from U.S.  
banks. In an early attempt, Shrieves and Dahl (1992) emphasized the endogenous determination of  
a bank’s capital and risk. Within a simultaneous equations framework, they found that the majority  
of banks mitigate the effects of increases in capital by increasing exposure to asset risk.  
Following  from  this  research,  several  studies  have  investigated  the  capital-risk 
relationship, with mixed results. In case of US, studies found that banks responded to the new 
capital standards by increasing risk (Jacques and Nigro, 1997; Aggarwal and Jacques, 2001). Rime 
(2001) offered similar evidence for Switzerland, suggesting that regulatory pressure led banks to 
increase their levels of capital. Flannery and Rangan (2004) explain the capital build-up of US banks 
during the 1990s by increased capital requirements such as the FDIC Improvement Act and the 
withdrawal of implicit government guarantees.  
In contrast, several others have also reported an inverse relationship. For example,  
looking at UK banks over 1998-2003, Alfon et al. (2004) uncovered a negative relationship between  
capital and risk in U.K. banks and building societies. Others that report a negative association  
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include Rime (2001) for Swiss banks, Das and Ghosh (2004) for Indian state-owned banks, Stolz 
(2007) for German banks.  
Another strand of the literature links risk taking to bank ownership. This link is best 
exemplified by considering the objective function of shareholders and the potential principal-agent 
problems between shareholders and management. While privately-owned banks tend to focus on 
profit maximization, government-owned banks might have additional considerations.  
Beginning with the line of research, several authors have investigated the interlinkage  
between ownership and bank risk. On the one hand, cross-country studies consistently highlight that  
higher government ownership could jeopardize bank stability (La Porta et al., 2002; Barth, Caprio  
and Levine, 2004).  In contrast, analyses examining the risk behavior of Islamic banks are quite  
limited. Employing data for 1993-2004 on OECD economies, Čihák and Hesse (2010) documents  
that small Islamic banks are more stable as compared to similar-sized conventional banks. Focusing  
primarily on the MENA countries, Hasan and Dridi (2010) finds that pre-crisis profitability of Islamic  
banks to be higher than their conventional counterparts, although these differences petered out  
during the crisis.  
 
III. Database and variables  
III.1 Database  
The analysis employs a detailed bank-level dataset. The core of the data is the 
information on bank’s balance sheet and income statement details as published by Bankscope, a 
comprehensive, global database containing information on nearly 30,000 public and private banks 
globally, maintained by International Credit Analysis Limited (IBCA).  
We use a sample comprising of an unbalanced panel of annual report data from 1996- 
2011 for the GCC banking system, comprising commercial and Islamic banks. The sample initially 
contained nearly 120 banks, but subsequently we deleted the finance and investment companies, 
including investment banks, providing us with 112 banks. Several banks also do not report data on the 
dependent variables employed in the analysis, which we exclude from the sample. After this 
filtering, we have observations on 103 banks at an average of 10.3 years of observations, yielding a 
maximum of 1065 bank-years. To moderate the influence of outliers, we winsorized the top and 
bottom 1% of observations for the dependent variable.  
Table 1: Composition of banks by country  
Country Conventional Islamic Listed Avg no. of Total 
banks banks years of observations 
observations 
Bahrain 11 20 11 7.8 243 
Kuwait 6 9 14 9.3 139 
Oman 6 0 5 13.3 80 
Qatar 7 3 8 11.5 115 
Saudi Arabia 9 4 11 13.2 172 
UAE 18 10 21 11.3 316 
Total 57 46 70 10.3 1065 
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The summary statistics suggest that, on average, banks are well-capitalized with equity-to- 
asset in excess of 10%, the regulatory minimum stipulated by most countries. Banks also appear to 
exhibit high stability, as evidenced from their high Z-scores. Contextually, it may be mentioned that in 
2011, Z-scores of banks in major developed economies such as US, UK, Germany, France and Sweden 
ranged from a low of 0.9 in UK to a high of 1.45 as in US (World Bank, 2013).  
 
Table 2: Variable definition and summary statistics 
Variable Definition 
 
Dependent variables 
CAP Capital/Total asset 
 
Z-score log(1+Z), where Z=(CAP+RoA)/SD(RoA), where RoA=return 
on asset and SD(RoA) is the rolling standard deviation of 
RoA based on observations in year t, t-1 and t-2 
Control variables 
Size Log (total asset) 
 
RoA Profit/Total asset 
 
Loans Loans/Total asset 
 
Funding Short-term funding/Total asset 
 
Cost/Income Cost-to-income ratio 
 
Divers Index  of  income  diversification,  defined  following 
Stiroh(2004) as 
2 2 
Mean p.25 p.75 
(SD) 
 
0.144 0 0.164 
(0.202) 
2.628 1.938 3.228 
(1.065) 
 
 
6.475 6.027 6.995 
(0.685) 
0.019 0.013 0.028 
(0.058) 
0.515 0.403 0.658 
(0.210) 
0.144 0.031 0.207 
(0.154) 
0.300 0.000 0.432 
(0.481) 
0.364 0.306 0.465 
(0.131)  
1- (SHNET   SHNON ) ,where 
NET NON 
SHNET  SHNON  
NET  NON NET  NON 
NET=net interest income; NON=non interest income 
RPH Dummy=1 if for a bank the ratio of its regulatory to actual 0.255 0 1 
capital  belongs  to  the  top 25  percentile  of  the (0.436) 
distribution, else zero 
RPL Dummy=1 if for a bank the ratio of its regulatory to actual 0.253 0 1 
capital belongs  to  the bottom 25  percentile  of  the (0.435) 
distribution, else zero  
MREG Dummy=1 if a bank is listed, else zero 0.679 0 1 
(0.467)  
Islamic Dummy=1 if a bank is Islamic, else zero 0.447 0 1 
(0.497)  
Crisis Dummy=1 for 2009, else zero 0.061 0 1 
(0.239)  
 
Among others, 15% of banks funding are short-term in nature, although their  
cost-to-income are among the lowest. The average bank is fairly small in size with high profitability  
levels, close to 2% of total assets. These profitability numbers are comparable to, and in some  
cases, even better than those obtaining for advanced economies (See,for example, BIS 2013).  
 
III.2 Measurement of risk  
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There is limited consensus in the literature as to the measurement of risk.2 Researchers  
have employed various risk measures, such as risk-weighted assets to total assets (Shrieves and  
Dahl, 1992; Jacques and Nigro, 1997; Avery and Berger, 2001; Van Roy, 2008); non-performing loan  
ratio (Shrieves and Dahl, 1992), loan loss reserves (Altunbas et al., 2007), while more recent  
research employs the Z-score (Boyd and Graham, 1988; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Barry et al.,  
2011; Bouwens and Verriest, 2014). Consistent with recent research, we use the Z-score. The Z- 
score indicates the distance from insolvency and combines accounting measures of leverage,  
profitability and volatility. As Barry et al. (2011) remark, the Z-score comprises of two elements: the  
first component - RoA/SD(RoA) - measuring asset risk and the second (K/A)/SD(RoA) measuring  
leverage risk. A higher Z-score indicates that the bank is more stable. Since the Z-score is positively  
skewed, we use the natural logarithm of Z-score, which is normally distributed (Laeven and Levine,  
2009).  
 
III.3 Measurement of capital  
Capital is measured as the ratio of capital to asset. In effect, total capital comprises of all 
the capital components permitted under the relevant Acts in each country and is comparable to the 
definition employed in the Basel accord.  
III.4 Control variables  
In the capital equation, the control variables include size and profitability. In addition, we 
include two sets of interaction terms. The first - CAPREG*CAP and CAPREG*∆RISK - ascertains how 
regulatory pressure responds to capital and changes in risk.  
The capital pressure variable (CAP) is defined as the ratio of capital ratio stipulated by the 
regulatory authorities in respective countries to the bank's actual capital adequacy ratio, a higher 
ratio implying greater regulatory pressure. The second - MREG*CAP and MREF*∆RISK - focuses on 
how banks with market pressure respond to capital and risk.  
The control variables in the risk equation include size, funding, index of income profile, 
inefficiency and the interaction terms, akin to those earlier.  
Besides, we include dummy to distinguish between Islamic and conventional banks, in addition to a 
dummy for crisis. All the specifications control for country and year shocks by including an interaction 
term between country and year effects.  
 
IV. Empirical Strategy  
Following Shrieves and Dahl (1992) and Van Roy (2007), we employ the simultaneous 
equation setup for bank b at time t as given by (1) and (2) 
 
 
Since all banks are not listed and most of their assets being not marketable, it s difficult to compute the volatility for the 
market price of bank's assets. Likewise, since all banks are not rated and have not received any external support, computing 
sophisticated measures of risk are not possible.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
tbtbtbtb wRISKRISKRISK ,1,
*
,, )(                                                                                        (2) 
tbtbtbtb uCAPCAPCAP ,1,
*
,, )(                                                                                               (1) 
 
 In effect, the observed changes in capital and risk are a function of the target capital and risk levels,  
the lagged capital and risk levels and any random shocks. The target capital and risk levels are not 
directly observable, but are assumed to depend on a set of observable variables describing the 
bank's financial condition and country and year characteristics.  
The target capital ratio is assumed to depend on bank size, measure of profitability, 
changes in risk (∆RISK) and crisis, ownership and regulatory dummies, as discussed earlier. The 
variables used to proxy the target risk ratio are bank size, income diversification index, funding 
profile and several dummies, as discussed above.  
Given the setup, the empirical strategy has to account for the endogeneity of the 
regressors ∆CAP and ∆RISK. In contrast to the ordinary least squares, 3SLS estimators take the 
endogeneity into account, thereby producing consistent estimates.  
 
V. Discussion of the results  
Three sets of results are set out in Table 3. Specification 1 estimates the baseline model  
wherein adjustments in capital and risk differ according to the extent of regulatory and market  
pressure. Specification 2 allows for differential speeds of adjustment in capital and risk. Finally,  
specification 3 additionally allows for differences in the coordination of capital and risk adjustments.  
We first discuss the control variables. Table 3 (Model 1) indicates that bank size has a  
negative and significant effect on capital. The negative effect on capital is in line with the empirical  
literature and means that larger banks increase capital by a magnitude that is lower as compared to  
smaller banks. A possible explanation for this is that larger banks have easier access to capital  
markets or alternately, they prefer to undertake more monitoring rather than hold higher levels of  
expensive capital (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Van Roy, 2008). RoA has a highly statistically highly  
significant and positive impact on capital, consistent with previous research (Aggarwal and Jacques,  
2001; Rime, 2001; Van Roy 2008). This positive relation is also consistent with the pecking order  
hypothesis, which supports the bank’s preference for internal funding owing to lower costs (Myers  
and Majluf, 1984).  
In the risk equation, the coefficient on both Funding is negative while that on Divers is positive. Both  
these  coefficients  are  statistically  significant.  In  other  words,  banks  with  higher  wholesale  
dependence exhibit lower stability (i.e., higher risk): a 1% increase in wholesale dependence lowers  
bank stability by 0.8 percentage points. Banks with more diversified income streams are observed to  
be less risky. The fact that bank funding structures might be relevant in influencing bank risk-taking  
has been acknowledged in recent empirical research (Adrian and Shin, 2009; Ratnovski and Huang,  
2009; Raddatz, 2010).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Table 3: 3SLS estimation of capital and risk  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
∆CAP ∆RISK ∆CAP ∆RISK ∆CAP ∆RISK 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
RPH -0.040 0.075 -0.013 -0.123 -0.007 -0.069 
(0.014)*** (0.078) (0.036) (0.215) (0.038) (0.216) 
MREG -0.035 -0.192 -0.049 -0.023 -0.027 -0.114 
(0.014)*** (0.081)*** (0.019)*** (0.198) (0.021) (0.201) 
Adjustment coefficients 
 
CAP (t-1) -0.662 -0.491 -0.539 
(0.035)*** (0.042)*** (0.044)*** 
Risk (t-1) -0.455 -0.430 -0.456 
(0.034)*** (0.059)*** (0.059)*** 
Response of endogenous 
variables 
∆CAP 0.651 0.653 (0.266)*** 0.683 
(0.282)*** (0.213)*** 
∆RISK -0.006 -0.005 -0.084 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.023)*** 
Interaction terms 
 
RPH*CAP(t-1) -0.251 -0.299 
(0.229) (0.238) 
RPH*RISK(t-1) 0.075 0.057 
(0.076) (0.076) 
MREG*CAP (t-1) -0.381 -0.346 
(0.064)*** (0.066)*** 
MREG*RISK (t-1) -0.063 -0.026 
(0.071) (0.072) 
RPH*∆RISK 0.027 
(0.016)* 
MREG*∆RISK 0.076 (0.021)*** 
 
RPH*∆CAP 2.623 (1.371)** 
 
MREG*∆CAP -0.577 
(0.562) 
Dummy variables 
 
Islamic 0.040 -0.134 0.037 -0.141 0.038 -0.125 
(0.015)*** (0.089) (0.015)*** (0.091) (0.015)*** (0.089) 
Crisis -0.003 0.342 -0.057 0.363 -0.002 0.245 
(0.161) (0.937) (0.157) (0.939) (0.162) (0.733) 
Country*Year YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Period 1996-2011 1996-2011 1996-2011 1996-2011 1996-2011 1996-2011 
N.Obs 683 683 683 683 683 683 
R-squared 0.451 0.328 0.479 0.326 0.461 0.334 
Standard errors in brackets  
***, *** and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively  
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As regards the impact of regulatory pressure, the results in model 1 suggest that, 
banks with high regulatory pressure increase capital by less¸ than banks with high buffers, although 
their response to risk appears to be limited. On the other hand, banks with higher market pressure 
lower their capital and raise risk as compared to those with no market pressure.  
The parameter estimates of lagged capital and risk are statistically highly significant, 
consistent with previous research for the US (Jacques and Nigro, 1997) and elsewhere (Rime, 2001; 
Das and Ghosh, 2004). The expected negative sign lie in the [0,1] interval. Hence, these can be 
interpreted as speed of capital and risk adjustments. In general, the speed of capital adjustment is 
roughly 1.2-1.5 times higher than the speed of risk adjustment.  
As regards the response of endogenous variables, the parameter estimate of ∆RISK in the 
capital equation is insignificant, whereas the parameter estimate of ∆CAP in the risk equation is 
positive and highly significant. Van Roy (2008) also reports similar evidence for European and 
Canadian banks in the cross-country study, although their US sample banks did not exhibit any 
discernible response of either capital or risk.  
While the coefficient on the interaction term of RPH with lagged capital and risk 
variables are insignificant, the coefficient on MREG*Cap(t-1) is negative and statistically significant in 
Models 2 and 3, indicating that banks facing market discipline adjust capital thrice as fast as 
compared to banks with no such discipline.  
Further, we find that the estimated coefficients on RPH*∆RISK is significant and 
positive, while the estimated coefficient of RPH*∆CAP is significant, positive and nearly four times 
larger than the coefficient on ∆CAP. This finding indicates that capital and risk adjustments are 
negatively correlated for banks with high regulatory pressure. These positive coefficients are in line 
with recent evidence for US market (Shim, 2010).  
Looking at ownership, when significant, the coefficient on Islamic is   positive and 
significant in the ∆CAP equation, indicating that, after controlling for bank specific and country-year 
characteristics, changes in capital are higher for Islamic as compared to conventional banks.  
 
VI.  Concluding remarks  
The role of minimum capital requirements in the context of modern banking regulation 
has been a widely discussed and debated topic in the literature. However, whether and to what 
extent does higher capital level encourage or dissuade risk-taking by banks remains an empirical 
question. The evidence on this aspect for GCC banks is admittedly limited.  
In this context, the present paper employs data on an extended sample of GCC banks to 
examine this issue in detail. Three major findings emerge. First, banks generally lower capital in 
response to an increase in risk, and not vice versa. Second, there is an uneven impact of regulatory 
pressure and market discipline on banks attitude towards risk and capital. And third, Islamic banks 
increased their capital as compared to conventional banks.  
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